More “meat” for the army, more prisons for the FSB, fines for the Interior Ministry

In July, the spring-summer session of the State Duma ends. It is holding its final meetings, considering a large number of bills. Political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann spoke to the editor-in-chief of “Tochka” and “MO,” Maksim Glikin, about what distinguished the deputies this political season and why they are again prohibiting and tightening so much.

— During the spring-summer session, deputies again adopted a mass of new prohibitions and restrictions. A slew of prohibitive norms were introduced, threatening foreigners, those who have left, and the disloyal. What’s the logic here? It feels like there’s nothing left to ban and no one left to threaten.
 
Let’s start with the fact that the fate of the State Duma is unenviable. Over the past three convocations, it has gained and maintained the reputation of a "mad printer." However, if we look closely at all its legislative activity, the prohibitions and restrictions it introduces do not actually give it any new repressive powers.

From the outside, it might seem like a terrifying government body that repeatedly bites off citizens’ rights and freedoms. In fact, if you read what is being passed, it’s the delegation of authority to the executive branch. Prohibitive and repressive bills have long been written intentionally vaguely, precisely to provide maximum leeway to the final law enforcer.

Therefore, by the way, the lower the status of the regulation, the better it is enforced. Our Constitution is something of a rhetorical exercise, while a departmental instruction will be followed to the letter. And no one will openly violate it.

At the same time, departmental instructions and regulations must refer to federal legislation and, so to speak, nest within it. So, if we understand this logic, we won’t resort to clichés about laws in Russia not being enforced, or that they may be good, but no one follows them. They are monstrous — and they are enforced. 

Thus, the Duma is “fronting,” as they say these days, for entirely different clients, who are the initiators and beneficiaries of these legislative innovations. 

“Little helpers of the Ministry of Defense”

— Who are these main clients?

— Let’s start with the Ministry of Defense. This year, deputies continued to serve its interests by creating and supporting tools that would supply new recruits without the state needing to declare a new mobilization. We see that the experience of autumn 2022 was deemed too risky. And the system is doing everything to avoid it. At the same time, it clearly does not intend to stop fighting. Moreover, it does not intend to stop fighting using the same methods it has so far. These methods require “meat.” So, it must be supplied.

One way to supply it is with money. And this has been set up very cleverly: the main financial burden has been shifted to the regions, not the federal center.

The federal payout is 400 thousand. This amount is set by presidential decree and does not change. But in the regions, it’s just a kind of marketplace… Some regions raise the payout amount, others lower it, some raise it only for a limited time. Like, hurry up, or it’ll be too late. It’s an exciting, dynamic market. 

Meanwhile, the State Duma is creating more and more opportunities for signing a contract not just to remove existing criminal liability, but also to close the criminal case. In other words, the fact of the crime or offense becomes as if it never happened. If you, standing over a bloodied corpse, so to speak, say: “I’m safe, look, I’ve signed a contract with the Ministry of Defense” — there will be no case, no conviction, no investigation. What will happen to the victims, we don’t yet know.

— But removal of criminal liability isn’t the only incentive?

— Of course. Another measure is removing all barriers to signing a contract. Now you only need to be 18 years old. The recruit doesn’t need education or military service experience — not even Russian citizenship, or any citizenship at all. Stateless persons, apatrides, can now also sign a contract with the Ministry of Defense. 

That is, any human being who appears to be of age, regardless of whether they speak a language, know left from right, or what their past, present, or hypothetical future is — can be a contract soldier. 

In addition, there is increased liability for failing to report oneself to the military enlistment office. The conscription system is being made as all-encompassing as possible. This is necessary to control the general pool of potential conscripts and contract soldiers.

Thus, deputies are acting as little helpers of the Ministry of Defense.

Pits and barracks for Ukrainians

— Who else from the security agencies do they help?

The Duma is also a little helper of the FSB, which actively acted as a legislative lobbyist this session. 

One can name the law requiring prior approval from the FSB for any scientific or educational event involving any foreign citizens or organizations, regardless of how friendly the country is or the level of the event. That is, just any foreigners at universities or research institutes must be cleared by the FSB. 

If I understand the essence of this initiative correctly, it’s not quite fair to call it purely FSB-driven. It seems to be a collaborative creation, with the first idea, oddly enough, belonging to the Ministry of Education and Science. It’s an attempt by the ministry to shield its flock from endless treason cases against scientists by shifting some responsibility onto the FSB. 

— Will this work in practice?

It’s a naive attempt. Spoiler: it won’t work. For the FSB, prior approval won’t be an obstacle to opening a criminal case. In recent years, we’ve clearly seen: the FSB cannot be held accountable for anything. Whatever happens, the FSB is never guilty and never responsible, even within its direct duties. So, if your event had prior approval, they’ll tell you the event was approved, but during it you were spying and committing treason. And you’ll go to jail anyway. 

In practice, this will lead to Russian educational and scientific institutions avoiding all contact with any foreigners, including friendly Chinese. Or, if contact is necessary, they’ll avoid formalizing it. But then it’ll be even easier to jail them. 

— Are there any other important novelties for the FSB?

— Yes, a bill returning the Lefortovo detention center to FSB control. This involves amending the Penal Enforcement and Criminal Procedure Codes. Some colleagues see this initiative as a potential sign of preparation for more mass repressions by the FSB. But to organize mass arrests, it’s not about transferring Lefortovo from FSIN to FSB — it’s about introducing procedural norms that allow more people to be quickly pushed through the grinder.

Nevertheless, this bill is highly symbolic. It marks a break from the last remnants of the need to comply with European norms, under which those who conduct investigations cannot also guard the detainees. That’s why we have FSIN — a separate structure supposedly under the civilian Ministry of Justice, although it’s not really a civilian agency. FSIN doesn’t conduct investigations, and investigators don’t have their own prisons.

This rule is now being repealed. Perhaps FSB investigators are tired of going to Lefortovo as assigned staff and pretending. They want to rule their domain absolutely. The hypocrisy that is the necessary clothing of civilization — we have proudly thrown it off and now dance naked before the honest public.

That’s one side. On the other, we can imagine that under this pretext they might not only take Lefortovo but also legalize their horrific filtration camps and prisons for Ukrainians. These would be FSB detention centers where no light of day ever shines. It doesn’t now, because they are non-existent structural units. As if they don’t exist.

What happens there? Well, those who make it out alive tell their stories. And what they tell is so horrific that it’s hard to understand how they haven’t lost their minds. This system can process quite a lot of people. Many passed through it from border, frontline, or so-called newly annexed territories.

This filtration system is probably the worst thing happening to the former Russian law enforcement system. However horrible and torturous our penal colonies or detention centers may be, at least lawyers go there, letters come out, you can send care packages, and relatives can visit. There is some known authority. There's an address to write to.

You can complain about them, ultimately. Maybe nothing will come of it. Or maybe something will — like in the case of Anya Zhuravleva (we wrote about her here).

But these pits in the ground, these barracks in unknown locations — that’s complete darkness. And, as you understand, our proud fellow citizens do this hellish work. And they won’t stay there. They’ll spread this magical experience all over Great Russia.

“You can’t talk about the Elephant, but you can talk about migrants”

— So the main clients among the security forces are the Ministry of Defense and the FSB?

— I would name a third agency the deputies helped a bit: the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). 

Here we should pay attention to the anti-migrant campaign, which was one of the key themes of Duma activity this session, as it was in the previous one. About the topics we discussed earlier, deputies don’t publicly talk much. No one’s going to advertise new fines for draft offices or the transfer of prisons to the FSB. Volodin won’t tell you about that.

But about migrants — he will. That’s a permitted topic. On one hand, it’s something people genuinely care about — a real social phenomenon and thus a source of tension and conflict globally.

On the other hand, it’s something you *can* talk about when you’re forbidden to talk about the Elephant in the room. The Elephant has almost trampled you already, but even as it crunches your spine, you can’t say what’s really happening. You must be silent or talk about negative growth, planned cooling, and other fictions. 

So you can’t talk about the Elephant, but you can talk about migrants. That’s why deputies spoke about it a lot this spring session — and passed quite a few laws.

— And what’s the general concept behind what was passed?

— The concept is: there are no restrictions yet on entry for migrants from nearby countries. From post-Soviet visa-free states, it’s still easy to enter Russia. There are no visa requirements or official quotas. But inside the country, there’s endless tightening of rules, with one clear direction: more and more rights and powers are given to MVD officers who monitor migration.

It feels like the MVD — the unloved and underfed child among the security forces, chronically understaffed, with each ministry board report showing growing shortages — is being given a treat. Yes, we know you’re underpaid, that many left for military contracts — those who were, let’s say, greedier or dumber. We get that you lack the FSB’s power or the National Guard’s pretty uniforms. But here’s this powerless migrant herd — shear it, butcher it. It’s yours.

In this sphere, we’re seeing more power and less oversight for the MVD. Note, by the way, that despite lots of talk, no separate agency for migration has appeared. In 2016, the Federal Migration Service was dissolved and made part of the MVD’s Main Directorate for Migration. In April 2025, this was renamed the Service for Citizenship and Foreign Citizen Registration, but it’s still a subdivision of the MVD.

This means the top authority on all these issues remains the MVD. It’s their burden — and their bread.

— But it seemed to me that there were lots of new bans on interaction with foreigners. Besides control over scientists: bans on state agencies, banks, and telecoms communicating with citizens via foreign messengers; SIM cards for foreigners only via biometrics; stricter entry and stay rules for foreign visa holders. Foreign SIMs won’t work for direct calls.

— I’d put that under the heading “Support for the MVD.” A powerful source — or at least pretext — for limiting citizens’ rights is the fight against phone fraud. It’s become a social scourge, but lawmakers don’t care what’s really happening — they want a reason to get at people more effectively.

All these measures fit into the broader trend of self-isolation. Russia wants, on one hand, to isolate itself from harmful external influences, but also to bypass sanctions and import what it needs. So our isolation is just as ambiguous as everything else in Russia’s domestic — and foreign — policy.

— But why is this isolation needed at all?

Look, we’re at war, right? If we’re at war, we’re surrounded by enemies. If we’re surrounded by enemies, isolationist rhetoric follows naturally. At the same time, we’ll say there’s no isolation — on the contrary, Russia is more recognized and loved than ever before by the non-Western world, leading anti-colonial resistance.

The collective Russian leadership wants freedom from international obligations. That’s why we left treaties, human rights conventions, the Bologna system. We want our graduates’ diplomas to be non-convertible — so they don’t flee, but stay to work at a drone factory in Alabuga and think of nothing else.

We don’t want any commitments, but we also don’t want the kind of isolation where no one sells or buys anything from you. Soviet-Korean-style self-sufficiency and autarky — producing everything ourselves — is neither feasible nor even desirable. 

By the way, have you noticed no one talks about import substitution anymore? It’s not trendy. But they’ll say: we talk less about it because we’ve already achieved it. We’re a completely self-sufficient economy. Only, there’s no potatoes — no seed material, because that came from the EU. And with other crops, it’s also tricky — turns out, all of that was imported from the EU. But overall, we’ve successfully import-substituted.