Investigations
The Return of the “Doppelganger”
An investigation into how MGIMO led a large-scale disinformation and propaganda campaign, and future diplomats became employees of a new “troll factory”
This text was created by the "Point Media" team and published on Explainer — our team's new website.
An investigation into how MGIMO led a large-scale disinformation and propaganda campaign, and future diplomats became employees of a new “troll factory”
Beginning diplomats are taught to lie and spread myths from their first year. One of its employees—a student at MGIMO—told “MO” about how the fake‑news factory was structured within the notorious “Doppelgänger” project. He agreed to do propaganda in exchange for a stipend top‑up. We found that despite Western sanctions and blocks, the factory still operates today.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine significantly affected pro‑Kremlin propaganda. Western countries blocked hundreds of websites connected to the Kremlin, banned dozens of Russian TV channels (like RT, Channel One, Russia‑1, and others), and refused visa renewals for journalists. Under these new conditions, Kremlin propaganda sought new methods for spreading disinformation in the West and interfering in other countries’ politics. The idea was simple and hardly original—to flood social media with fakes and bots, and to create websites mimicking major international media and other trusted sources.
The disinformation campaign was named “Doppelgänger” (“Double”), and its execution was handled by a mysterious “Team I” led by political technologist Ilya Gambashidze. “Team I” created not only the high‑profile cloned sites of Western media, but also original news portals promoting the Kremlin agenda in the West and spreading fakes. Since 2023, “Team I” has launched dozens of original resources in German, French, Italian, Hebrew, and other languages. Each site—designed like a typical news portal—featured articles on topics like politics, sports, women’s issues, military affairs. After publication, links to fake articles were amplified on social networks through coordinated bot activity.
In 2024, journalists from Dossier, Süddeutsche Zeitung, NDR and WDR, as well as Estonia’s Delfi, obtained documents from the Russian “Agency for Social Design,” which disseminates Kremlin propaganda. After a major investigation by European and American intelligence in September 2024, many of the sites were deactivated. However, “MO” found that several resources continue to operate today—using new domains but retaining their original site names.
“Team I” is not an ordinary private fake‑news factory like the Wagner trolls—it is overseen by Kremlin administration officials, including Sergey Kiriyenko. In the Correctiv investigation, it is stated that the operation was coordinated through Kremlin‑connected organizations like ANO “Dialogue” and the “Agency for Social Design.” Our insider, "Sasha" (name changed), worked for “Dialogue.” A MGIMO graduate, he joined “Team I” in 2023. MGIMO now recruits Team I members.
Sasha’s classmate told him about “text‑based work” with good pay—he completed a test and joined the editorial team. He explains that a stipend-supported student offered a part‑time remote job with a 100 000 ₽ salary will snatch it up tightly. Vacancies are passed via acquaintances or even open MGIMO club chats; here’s a screenshot from one language‑club chat.
To join, Sasha simply applied. They sent a test—a short translation from Russian to Hebrew, English, French, or German (MGIMO offers 55 languages). English, French, and German were most popular: plenty of content online, and the USA, Germany, France are traditional targets of Russian propaganda.
“The Russian text was quite ordinary: it had a faint pro‑government hint like an average Russian paper, though sometimes worse,” Sasha says. “The general message was that the state must somehow handle [sexual education].”
The test described former French education minister Papa Ndiaye’s plan to introduce sex‑ed classes, laced with manipulative, emotionally‑loaded phrases like “LGBT craziness” and “drag‑queen children’s readings” in Europe. Sasha sent his translation—and then received a callback.
Hiring was fully online; on the first call Sasha was briefed on the project’s purpose: creating a positive image of Russia abroad, and he was asked to sign an NDA (which we’ll return to), then added to a chat named “Editorial.” The employer in the NDA was one of the anonymous editorial entities. The agreement included asset seizure clauses and strict penalties: dismissal, damages, even criminal liability.
New staff began by translating, then writing their own articles to meet weekly KPIs. According to Sasha, the idea was that translators, by studying existing pieces, would pick up the editorial “house style.”
After joining, Sasha translated (and later wrote) three to five articles daily, and posted them on his assigned site.
“Translators earn 80 000 ₽/month; writers a bit more—100–120 000 ₽ depending on extra tasks,” he explains. For part‑time remote work alongside studies, that’s stellar money. Payment was cash “under the table” at a Moscow coworking space near ANO “Dialogue” and MIA “Rossiya Segodnya.” No taxes were paid.
Over time the tone worsened. “Early on we criticized specific EU governments and chose our own topics, but later they demanded a clear propaganda stance,” Sasha says.
Then “content plans” (“CPs”) began arriving from “above.” Each month authors received about five CPs. Several examples Sasha shared matched internal documents from the “Agency for Social Design” leaks, exposing “Team I.” Example: “Right‑wing parties – peace parties” exactly matches point 1 in Team I’s program meeting protocol. Thanks to these overlaps Sasha realized who he was really working for. Screenshots below show CPs identical to internal Team I materials.
Team E's internal protocol
Sasha's notes with KP - topics that authors should cover in their articles
Example of articles by the authors of the “Editorial” about “Macron is inciting World War III” and about the intrigues of the USA. The sites of the publications match the domains found to be involved in Operation Doppelgänger.
Article topics range from propaganda clichés ("Ukraine lost the war", "Zelensky is illegitimate") to situational pieces tied to EU elections or the 2024 Paris Olympics. On average one author must deliver 14–15 CPs monthly—so Sasha translated or wrote around 150 propaganda articles during his time. All his earlier texts matched those published on fake‑news sites. They claimed planned Olympic terror, “vassalization” of Europe, incompetent Macron, or Ukrainian hires for security roles.
An excerpt of an article from the Artichoc portal, which hyped the threat of Islamic terrorism at the 2024 Paris Olympics, matched the text provided by Sasha
An excerpt of an article from Le Belligerent portal, released by the authors of “Editorial”
“Team I’s policy is as flexible and tricky as Russia’s leadership,” Sasha says. Leadership often favors far‑right and alt‑right European parties skeptical of aid to Ukraine, but sometimes backs extreme left pacifists, too. Authors are told to praise Trump or criticize him; to urge EU leaders to follow him or to distance from “America betraying Europe.” Many sites drive anti‑migrant narratives, seizing on migrant‑involved crimes to sow chaos in European societies. Sasha believes his colleagues pushed both the fake Olympic‑bedbug myth and the viral #JeChieDansLaSeine hashtag urging Parisians to defile the Seine before the mayor Macron’s public swim.
Each Team I content network varies in scale: from 1–2 Hebrew authors to 8–12 for German or French languages. Networks are designed to lure audiences into echo chambers with a portfolio of thematic sites—political, news, women's, sports, celebrity, health, conspiracy, and more.
They even provided content briefs for astrologers acting as “experts.” Here is a chat screenshot they shared:
Screenshot of a message forwarded from work chat with questions for an expert astrologer
The screenshot reveals they also spread fakes about Ukrainian child trafficking—propaganda alleging Zelenska’s foundation sold children abroad for adoption or illicit transplant operations.
Even seemingly harmless sites embedded propaganda: sports portals fomented terror panic around the Paris Olympics; conspiracy sites had tarot‑reading forecasts on the Ukraine war.
Need an expert? Just invent one!
Top sites also publish exclusive interviews with fringe experts—marginal researchers and conspiracists. These included Pierre‑Antoine Plaquevent (anti‑globalist, author of “Soros and the Open Society”); Pierre Plas (former French intelligence officer denying Russian crimes in Bucha); Bernard Monot (former MEP from National Front, justifying Pétain’s actions); Vafa Dui (RUDN graduate, director of MaghRus Trading).
From 2019, Gajic is a professor at the Department of Comparative Political Science at MGIMO
Writers earn a 15–20 000 ₽ bonus for handling interviews. Management selects “experts,” while authors craft questions. Most begin with leading political comments to steer responses; videos are more neutral to preserve the illusion of impartiality.
The stranger and harsher the briefs, the more authors tried to detach themselves from their work.
“Most kids didn’t believe in what they wrote—it felt absurd. The main, maybe only, reason people stayed was money. Some wanted families, some to move out of dorms. I personally left once I could afford rent and quit the heavy job,” Sasha admits.
Alongside students, some European citizens living in Russia also worked there—Sasha calls them "ideological."
“Some study at MGIMO, others came for ‘traditional values,’ but all sincerely hold pro‑Russian views and don’t hesitate to work for Russian propaganda,” he explains.
They helped with tasks Russian citizens couldn’t legally handle—domain registrations under EU names, conducting interviews with real foreign experts. EU DisinfoLab and Qurium investigations show that shell companies and anonymous EU‑registered bank accounts were used to pay authors and legitimize operations, complicating investigations and blocks.
“At first students posted articles from their phones in lectures, but later that was banned,” Sasha says.
Management mandated anti‑detect browsers, fake IPs per user, 2FA on Telegram, and no Russian‑sounding names.
“MO” analyzed metadata in the NDA file Sasha signed. Created January 2023, the author field reads: Evgenia Nikolaevna Pobedonostseva. Since early 2023 she has been director of legal affairs at ANO “Dialogue” (Kremlin‑linked), according to leaked FTS data. Dialogue is headed by Vladimir Tabak, a close ally of Sergey Kiriyenko. Since 2024, the company has been sanctioned by the UK and US for spreading fakes about Ukraine.
She shares a surname with Alexander III’s ideological opponent Konstantin Pobedonostsev (“enemy of democracy,” whose “owl wings” Block referenced). She rose through the prosecutor’s office, serving from 2013–2019 as deputy head of the Southern Federal District’s office. She was also listed in January–February 2022 state media comms for forums on returning Russian children from Syria under ombudswoman Lvova‑Belova’s guidance.
In 2015, at age 36, she was granted the rank of State Counselor of Justice 3rd class (equivalent to major‑general in the prosecutor’s service) by presidential decree (source). Konstantin Pobedonostsev held the rank of actual State Counselor.
In tax data for 2023 she declared just 306 000 ₽—even less than the authors she hired. But such envelope pay is unsurprising. According to SuperJob, mid‑level Moscow lawyers earn around 1.4 mln ₽/year. In 2020, during her prosecutor tenure, she declared 3.7 mln ₽ on Declarator.
Evgenia Pobedonostseva, 2019
In 2023 she provided her passport and phone to Alfa‑Bank client records. A Facebook account under that number—purportedly held by lawyer Alexander Lunin—exists with just one friend and no public activity. OSINT Industries confirmed she doesn’t use apps or social media under her real identity. However she does have a Telegram account on a different number. “MO” asked her for comment, but she hadn’t responded by publication time.
The chat was usually moderated by a fellow MGIMO student or alum, who communicated with leadership and presumably knew the true project name and authors. All reported to “Elena,” who issued content plans via secret Telegram chats, tracked views, and evaluated results.
“MO” identified her from open records and tax leaks: 41‑year‑old Elena Rodnova, unemployed mother of two, ex‑wife of former NTV and REN‑TV journalist Andrey Rodnov. This is confirmed by Moscow court records. Rodnova reviewed and edited articles, sourced experts, and selected interview questions. Her name and contacts appeared in Rosmolodezh press releases from 2022. She was absent from the Agency for Social Design leaks.
Some resources Sasha or colleagues worked on aren’t mentioned in US/EU intelligence or media investigations—but many were discovered by EU security agencies. For example, France’s Ministry of Defense and National Security exposed Reliable News Network (RRN) as Kremlin‑linked in July 2023. Yet Russian propaganda funding continued into mid‑2024 until the US Justice Department blocked it in autumn 2024.
Alongside RRN, US banned artichoc.io, lexomnium.com, and levinaigre.net. By summer 2024, a Recorded Future report listed most French network sites active during Sasha’s tenure. Some are now inaccessible, some blocked, but others remain active with the same site names (e.g. https://notrepays.today/, https://allons-y.social, https://lesfrontieres.media)—some are primarily anti‑migrant. Below is an almost complete list of sites Sasha worked on. Some have moved domains. Despite many blocks, most site names remain unchanged.
Screenshot of the names of websites associated with the Doppelgänger network
Recorded Future report on Russian and Iranian influence networks
Screenshots from Sasha's correspondence with colleagues
One of the propaganda texts on the legal website lexomnium.com, part of Doppelgänger
Some sites changed domain zones—for example Lex Omnium, Le Belligerent, Le Vinaigre switched from .com/.net to .su, continuing to call on peaceful Europeans to migrate to Russia, which “withstood the war,” and to accuse Macron of wasting money on defense when “France has internal problems.”
Such changes occurred while Sasha worked there: if a resource was blocked by EU services or otherwise unreachable, they’d switch domains but keep the name—e.g., .com to .io or .news. Even after DOJ seized a site, these simple fixes may not suffice. Still, at least six sites continue publishing under the same name today. Even after the exposé and scandal, operation “Doppelgänger” continues almost unchanged.
*Earlier versions wrongly claimed BfV operations in Dresden. Primary source checks and German authorities denied those allegations. (Editor’s note).
